

4th Workshop on the Security of Space and Satellite Systems

Temporal Risk on Satellites


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Background

- Where do threats in space occur?



User / Ground Segment




Link Segment



Navigation



Communications



Earth Observation

Space Segment

- What are the threats to space?


User terminal exploitation
Ground-network compromise

Jamming & Spoofing

Unauthorized control
On-orbit firmware exploitation


Observation

- When threats occur also matters!
 - The environment is changing over time.
- Threats are physically predictable.
 - Based on orbital mechanics and space weather.



Motivation: The Temporal Gap

Current Static Frameworks (e.g., SPARTA Approach¹)



The *Missing* Dimension



The Resulting Gaps



**Incomplete
Likelihood**



**Impact
Underestimation**




**Misaligned
Defenses**

¹Ear, Ekzhin, Brandon Bailey, and Shouhuai Xu. "Towards principled risk scores for space cyber risk management."


Solution: Temporal Risk Assessment

Input: Discretization Process



Step1: Divides continuous missions into meaningful time windows.

Output: Dynamic Risk Estimates



Step2: Generates a series of time-indexed matrices reflecting changing vulnerabilities.

Key Idea: Treat timing as a primary concern in threat assessment.

Solution: Temporal Adversary Capabilities

	Script kiddies	Hackers for hire	Small hacker teams	Insider threats	Large well-organized teams	Highly capable state actors	Most capable state actors	
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	Actuation Causing effects within a given access window.
-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	Forecasting Predicting future access windows and environment states.
-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	Sensing Near-real-time awareness of the system's state.
-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	Synchronization Aligning actions with a chosen time window.
-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	Hiding Timing actions to blend in with natural noise or space weather.

Solution: Temporal Exploitation Difficulty



Temporal Exploitation Difficulty

How hard it is to exploit at the right time



Intrinsic Properties

Dependent on orbital visibility

- Duration
- Frequency
- Predictability




Scenario-Specific Constraints

Driven by the specific attack objective

- Aligning an uplink with a critical mission phase

Case Study: The STARMELT Attack

Attack Anatomy



Static Framework Risk Score



SPARTA Mapping

EX-0013.01: Valid Commands

Issues legitimate actions to progressively deplete resources (e.g., battery energy).

⚠ Static NRS Score (High-Criticality)

25 (HIGH)


Likelihood:5/5




Impact:5/5



Case Study: Sunlight vs. Eclipse Risk



Risk: Medium



Risk: High

Takeaways

- Don't treat space risk as static.
- Timing is a capability for attackers.
- Timing constraints directly affect likelihood of risks.
- Time-aware scheduling can be a mitigation.

Q & A

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